Similarity between source analogues and target problems is a central theme in the research on analogical transfer. Much of the theorizing and research has focused on the effects of superficial and structural similarity on transfer. The present research is an attempt to analyze systematically another critical type of similarity, namely, procedural similarity, and to examine its effects on the executing process. Participants viewed a schematic picture as a source model, interpreted its conceptual meaning, and then attempted to solve a problem to which the conceptual information from the source model could be applied. The results indicate that the ease with which a source solution was implemented was largely determined by the abstraction level at which a solution was shared by a source analogue and the target problem. The degree of procedural similarity was also found to influence the executing process in analogical transfer. A conceptual model concerning the function of procedural similarity as a utilizational constraint in analogical problem solving is proposed.
Analogical problem solving refers to the transfer of previously acquired knowledge or solutions from one context or domain to another. The investigation of the mechanisms of analogical problem solving has yielded a great deal of progress over the past 2 decades. Several studies have demonstrated that adults and children exhibit an ability to solve problems by using solutions from analogous situations (e.g., Bassok, 1990; Catrambone, 1996; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Ross, 1989; Siegler, 1989) , whereas other research has shown that individuals often fail to notice and use potentially helpful analogies in problem solving (e.g., Greeno, 1974; Hayes & Simon, 1977; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974) .
The degree of transfer is largely determined by the level of similarity shared between prior analogous information and the target problem to be solved. Thorndike's classic theory of common elements (Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901) proposes that transfer from one situation to another is determined by the degree of overlap between the two situations. Yet, Thorndike's notion of elements was ambiguous in terms of its nature and measures (Singley & Anderson, 1989) . A well-known notion related to the common elements idea concerns the distance of transfer that makes distinctions between types of transfer: near versus far; specific versus general; concrete versus abstract; and principlebased versus example-based transfer. However, the distinction between these types of transfer has been vague, and tests of these notions have been inconclusive because of the lack of suitable measures between problems. As Klahr and Carver (1988) have argued, the answer to the question of whether the learned solutions are limited to specifically similar situations or transferable across diverse tasks "hinges on our ability to construct measures of task similarity" between the source and target problems (p. 401). Without formulating a system to analyze the various types and levels of similarity between problem situations, it is impossible to measure transfer distance, to assess transfer ability, and to examine transfer mechanisms effectively.
Type of Similarity and Processes Involved in Analogical Problem Solving
We propose that the overall relations between a source analogue and a target problem involve multiple types of similarity. Problems may be similar or different in superficial attributes, structural features, or procedural operations. Two types of similarity-surface and structural-have been commonly identified (e.g., Gentner, Ratterman, & Forbus, 1993; Gick & Holyoak, 1983) . Superficial similarity refers to solution-irrelevant but salient details, such as object or characters in source and target problems. Structural similarity refers to the causal relations among the key components or the solution principle shared by the source and target problems. Yet this distinction between attributional versus conceptual, surface versus deep, or object versus relational similarities does not seem adequate to capture the complex, multicomponential relationships between source and target problems.
In the present research, we focused on another important type of similarity, namely, similarity in the procedural implementation of a solution. Procedure is defined as the transformation of a general solution principle or idea into concrete operations (a sequence of actions) relevant to goal attainment. By procedural similarity, we refer to the extent to which source procedural details match or differ from a target solution. The degree of procedural similarity between source and target problems can be depicted and measured in a hierarchy when other types of similarity are kept constant.
To illustrate the distinction between different types of similarity, we first briefly describe the problem adopted in the present research and then delineate these three types of similarity in the context of the present task. The target problem, modified from a traditional Chinese tale, was the "Weigh the Elephant" problem, which describes a scenario in which a boy needs to weigh an elephant but cannot find a scale big enough to weigh it; there is only a small scale available (see Appendix A). The general solution principle involves the weight equivalence notion: using smaller objects to equal the weight of the elephant and then weighing the smaller objects (rocks) separately with the small scale. The total weight of the smaller objects would then be the same as the weight of the elephant. This problem required participants to come up with specific procedures for equalizing the weights of the smaller items and that of the elephant.
Two solution procedures are appropriate for the target problem: the boat solution (sinking compression solution) and the tree solution (hanging balance solution). The first step of the boat solution is to put the elephant on a boat and mark the water level on the boat. The elephant is then replaced with some smaller objects (e.g., rocks or containers) so that the water level reaches the mark. The smaller objects are then weighed separately with the small scale. The tree solution involves harnessing the elephant with one end of a rope and throwing the other end over a sturdy tree branch, attaching a container to the free end of the rope, and adding small items until the two ends are balanced. This problem was generated for the present research because, although it requires an insight (the weight equivalence notion), grasping this general concept, in and of itself, is not adequate for solving the problem. A complete solution requires extending the insight into a concrete procedure (equalizing the weights of the smaller objects and the elephant). Figure 1 presents the components of the elephant problem and its potential solutions.
The ability to solve problems by analogy can be examined by providing a source analogue, such as a story or picture that describes a similar problem, and a solution that may be used to solve the target problem. A source analogue may share superficial similarities with the target problem, such as objects and characters: a curious boy, an elephant, and/or rocks. The source and target problems may also share similar structural relations in that both problems contain a goal (to weigh a large object), an obstacle (no large scale is available), resources (small scale and small objects), a solution principle (weight equivalence), and the outcome (weight of a large object known). When the causal relations between problems match, structural similarity is said to be high. However, if the solution principle (the weight equivalence notion) in the source analogue is not causally linked to other components of the goal structure, the relations between problems do not correspond and, thus, the structural similarity is said to be low. These two types of similarity are depicted in Figure 2 .
The distinction of the third type of similarity, namely, procedural similarity, which is also illustrated in Figure 2 , hinges on whether a solution illustrated in a source analogue is similar to the required target solution at a superordinate principle level, an intermediate strategy level, or a specific procedure level. At the most abstract or superordinate level, an analogue may provide a general solution orientation or principle for solving a target problem, yet more concrete implementational details for the principle are either absent or discrepant from the target solution. At an intermediate level, the source analogue and target problem share not only a general principle but also a more concrete strategy to implement it. However, they still differ in the most concrete operational details. At the most specific level, the source and target share a similar solution not only at the more general levels, but also in their concrete procedural details. Figure 2 illustrates the notion that the overall similarity between a source and a target problem may be analyzed with these three distinct types, and the degree of transfer in solving the target problem is determined by the magnitude of each type of similarity.
What cognitive processes might be associated with different types of similarity? Researchers (e.g., Brown, 1989; Chen & Siegler, 2000; Gentner, 1989; Reeves & Weisberg, 1993; Ross, 1989; Sander & Richard, 1997) have proposed that there are several cognitive components involved in analogical transfer. First, the potentially analogous relationship between the problems must be noticed and the correspondences between the key elements of the source and target must be mapped. Most studies on analogical problem solving have focused on these two processes (e.g., Brown & Campione, 1981 , 1984 Clement, Mawby, & Giles, 1994; Gentner et al., 1993; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Ross, 1984 Ross, , 1987 . These investigations suggest that a major obstacle to analogical transfer is the failure to notice analogous relations between problems and to access a source analogue. Informing participants about the potential usefulness of a source analogue is one common way to improve accessing the relevant information (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Ross, 1984; Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Weisberg, DiCamillo, & Phillips, 1978) . Once a source problem is accessed, the key elements and the causal relations must be mapped to the target problem to extend the solution principle from the source to the target problem (e.g., Chen & Daehler, 1992; Gentner, 1989) . A number of experiments have also shown that structural isomorphism benefits analogical problem solving (e.g., Clement & Gentner, 1991; Reed, 1987) .
Yet, noticing and mapping the analogous relations between source and target problems does not ensure that a solution principle can be automatically transformed into a solution for a target problem; another important process involves executing a solution principle in solving a concrete problem (e.g., Catrambone & Holyoak, 1990; Chen, 1995; Keane, 1996; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Reed & Bolstad, 1991) . Participants can be expected to have greater difficulty in executing a solution if the source solution does not provide enough implementation details. We hypothesize that the levels of procedural similarity will influence transfer performance through the execution, or utilization, process. For, even if participants successfully notice and map the relations between a source analogue and the target problem, they might experience difficulty in executing a learned source solution when it is similar to the required target solution only at a superordinate concept level. At an intermediate strategy level, participants might still experience an obstacle, but probably to a lesser extent. When the solutions share a similar specific procedure, the transfer distance is minimal and transfer performance should be greatly increased.
Although researchers have started to distinguish the noticing process from the applying process (e.g., Bassok, 1990; Catrambone, 1998; Catrambone & Holyoak, 1990; Ross, 1989) , relatively little is known about the factors influencing transfer through this component. One line of research, using mathematical problems, is particularly relevant to issues concerning the applying process. Reed and Bolstad (1991) manipulated the number of solution procedural transformations required in the solution of a target problem and found that participants' problem-solving performance declined as the number of transformations increased, results that suggest that participants experienced difficulty in using the solution procedure from the source examples.
The present research extends the previous work both in the theoretical issues addressed and in the empirical approach adopted. First, procedural similarity was manipulated explicitly and its effects on transfer were examined. Second, the present research used a hierarchical analysis of the levels of procedural similarity between source and target problems. In this hierarchy, the more concrete implementational operations (i.e., strategies and procedures) are rooted in the superordinate solution principle. Similarly, a strategy can also be exemplified by different specific procedures, which may or may not be similar to a required target solution procedure. Third, procedural similarity was distinguished from other types of similarity and the specific process associated with this similarity type was identified. Finally, the target problem and source analogues (pictorial schematic models) differ from the mathematical problems used in previous studies. The investigation of the mechanisms involving analogical transfer in this unique domain may also advance our understanding of pictorial information processing.
General Experimental Method
As described earlier, the target problem requires coming up with both an insight (the weight equivalence notion) and extending the insight into a concrete procedure (equalizing the weights of the smaller objects and the elephant). In this way, the present problem differs from other ill-defined (insight) tasks such as Duncker's (1945) radiation problem (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980 ) and riddle problems (e.g., Adams et al., 1988; Perfetto, Bransford, Franks, 1983; Ross, Ryan, & Tenpenny, 1989) and from well-defined problems such as physics and mathematical tasks (Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Reed, 1987 Reed, , 1989 Ross & Kennedy, 1990) . The requirement of both an insight idea and a concrete procedure allows the distinction between the execution process and the other components involved in transfer.
The tasks in the present research involved encoding and retrieving the conceptual meaning of a sequence of schematic pictures and using it to solve an analogous problem. The general paradigm involved first presenting a schematic model that provided potentially analogous information for the solution of the target problem. The participants were then asked to solve the target problem. The analogous relations between the source model and the target problem were not explicitly indicated in some experiments but were pointed out in others. Participants' problem-solving performance was observed with multiple measures (solution types, efficiency score, and problem-solving time), and the mechanisms of analogical transfer were assessed. Figure 3 illustrates the hierarchical representation of the various schematic models. The same general principle is embedded in the different models with multiple levels of abstraction (or concreteness) in a hierarchy. At the superordinate level (most general level), the source models illustrate the weight equivalence notion but provide no concrete way to achieve this goal. At the strategy level, the analogue models depict the idea that several smaller objects can push down a compressible surface to the same degree as one heavy object (compression models) or that a set of smaller items can balance a large object (balance models). Two specific procedures exemplify the compression model. The spring compression model is similar to the boat solution at the strategy level only whereas the sinking compression model is similar at the procedure level. The balance models illustrate the idea that if a set of smaller items and a large object are balanced, the weights are equal. Again, two specific ways to illustrate this strategy are introduced: the seesaw balance and hanging balance models. Only the hanging balance model matches the tree solution at the specific procedure level because it, like the concrete implementation of the tree solution, involves throwing one end of a rope over a tree branch and balancing the elephant and some other smaller items with such a device. Thus, at the most concrete procedure level, the models illustrate specific operational details that match the required target solution. The five schematic models used as source analogues are presented in Figure 4 .
Each analogue model illustrates either the abstract idea, a more concrete strategy, or an even more specific procedure analogous to the target solution. An abstract principle is distinguished from a concrete procedure on the basis of whether a general notion is illustrated along with a concrete way of implementing it. Thus, the schematic models vary in whether they contain a concrete procedure and whether the analogue is similar to a target solution at a superordinate, strategy, or procedure level. Figure 5 illustrates the various relationships between the models and each target solution.
The major assumption is that because a concrete procedure illustrates how the general principle and strategy are implemented, the application of the source information will be more direct and straightforward, especially when a similar procedure is required for the target problem. In contrast, although a source principle may provide a general orientation (the weight equivalence notion) toward the solution in which the specific solution strategies and procedures are rooted, solvers may not be able to implement the principle because its potential use is not illustrated. Thus, transfer degree is largely determined by the level of procedural similarity, and participants' problem-solving performance can be predicted by the abstraction level at which the source and target problem share a solution.
Schematic pictures, rather then verbal materials, were generated as source analogue models for several reasons. First, using pictorial models instead of verbal stories may help to avoid participants' directly copying the verbal description from the source passages in solving the target problem. The use of pictorial analogues requires the transformation of the conceptual meaning (solution) from the visual models to verbal solutions. Moreover, in each visual model, the conceptual idea (including the general principle or concrete procedure) is relatively free of domain content, although the gist or theme of these models (weight equivalence concept) is quite clear. The use of visual models helps to eliminate "content-rich" information and contextual backgrounds. Thus, the possible interference of other irrelevant, specific information (such as goal, characters, and objects) between the source models and target problems on the reasoning processes (such as accessing and mapping) may be minimized and be held constant across different models.
Overview of the Experiments
The two general hypotheses in the present research were (a) the likelihood of participants' generating an appropriate and complete solution would be, to a large extent, determined by the level of procedural similarity, and (b) procedural similarity would be distinguishable from other types of similarity and it would facilitate transfer through the executing process. Experiment 1 examined whether problem-solving performance varies depending on the abstraction level at which the source analogue and the target solution were similar. Both versions of the target problem were used, but only one solution (either the boat solution or the tree solution) was appropriate for each version. In Experiment 2, one solution was considered the consistent solution and the other was considered the inconsistent solution, depending on which of the two different strategies (compression or balance) was presented as the source model. When participants received the compression strategy models, they were predicted to use the boat solution more readily than the tree solution, whereas participants receiving the balance strategy models would generate the tree solution more effectively than the boat solution.
Experiment 3 was conducted to clarify whether the manipulation of procedural similarity influences transfer through the executing process. Participants were given a hint to consider the usefulness of the source models when attempting to solve the target problem. Moreover, labels indicating the correspondence between the items in the source models and the target problem were provided in the source models. If performance patterns similar to those in the previous studies were found, the differences in transfer between different levels of similarity would be attributable to an obstacle in executing the solution rather than in accessing the source analogue or in mapping the items. In Experiment 4, individual participants were asked to think aloud while attempting to solve the problem and were encouraged to elaborate on their solutions before and after a hint. Their protocols would provide further evidence concerning the effects of procedural similarity on executing solutions. Finally, Experiment 5 was conducted to further determine the relationship between procedural similarity and the executing process by explicitly asking participants to use specific target items (e.g., the boat) when attempting to solve the target problem.
Experiment 1
This experiment was designed to examine whether the level of procedural similarity influenced subsequent problem solving. The level of procedural similarity between problems is conceptualized in a hierarchical representation (see Figure 5 ). The major prediction was that transfer performance would prove to be a function of the degree to which a source model and a target problem shared a similar solution procedure. A general principle was hypothesized to be inadequate for analogical transfer because participants would have little information of how the principle could be implemented. Moreover, the higher the degree of concreteness shared by a source and the target solution, the higher the level of subsequent transfer that would result, because a similar procedure could be implemented more directly and readily.
Method
Participants. One hundred and sixty-three undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of Kentucky participated in this experiment for course credit.
Materials. The target problem was the "Weigh the Elephant" problem in which participants were asked to generate possible solutions for obtaining the weight of an elephant. The critical items (either a boat, or a tree and a rope) and other relevant items (e.g., a small scale, rocks, and other small objects) for generating an appropriate solution were introduced naturally in the story, and sketches of these objects, along with some other items (e.g., table, containers, and boxes), were provided on the problem-solving sheet. There were two versions of the target problem: the boat solution and the tree solution. The problem version was determined by whether the boat or the tree and the rope were included among the sketches. Thus, only one solution was appropriate for each version of the target problem because only one set of solution items was provided to each participant (see Appendix A). Five different analogue models were generated: principle only (no-procedure model); spring compression; sinking compression; seesaw balance; and hanging balance (see Figure 4 ). In the control condition, an irrelevant diagram (a square) was presented.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to 12 groups. As Table 1 reveals, these 12 groups were collapsed into four experimental conditions and a control condition. These experimental conditions were determined by the relations between a given source model and a given solution to the target problem. That is, the experimental conditions varied in whether the source model contained a concrete procedure (Groups 3-10) or not (Groups 1 and 2), and whether the model was similar to the target solution at the principle level (Groups 3-6), the strategy level (Groups 7 and 8), or the specific procedure level (Groups 9 and 10). The relations are also illustrated in Figure 5 .
The principle only model depicted only the superordinate concept, that is, the general relation between a large object and a set of smaller objects. No concrete information concerning how to achieve this comparison was illustrated. The similar principle models contained a specific strategy and procedure that illustrated the weight equivalence principle, but this idea was not similar to that required for the target problem at either the strategy or a procedure levels. Examples include the relations between the compression models and the tree solution and between the balance models and the boat solution. The similar strategy models illustrated concrete procedures similar to those required for the target problem at a strategy level but not at a procedure level. The relations between the spring compression model and the boat solution and between the seesaw balance model and the tree solution fall into this category. Finally, the similar procedure models depicted specific procedures that can be used to solve the target problem. The relations between the sinking compression model and the boat solution and between the hanging balance model and the tree solution exemplify this condition.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of 8 to 20. A booklet containing the source diagrammatical model and the target problem was constructed. Participants in all groups viewed a schematic picture serving as the source model and were instructed to view the model and to interpret and write down its possible meanings within 3 min.
Approximately 2 min elapsed between the picture-viewing and the problem-solving phases. Participants were then instructed to turn to the page containing the target story problem. The line drawings of the relevant and irrelevant items along with their labels were presented below the story. Participants were asked to read the story problem carefully within 80 s and to generate any solutions they thought appropriate using only the objects illustrated on the sheet. A total of 200 s was allowed for generating solutions to the target problem. To estimate the length of time and the order in which each solution was generated, five equal sections of space divided by lines were provided. The participants were told to begin writing down their solutions in the first section. After every 40 s of elapsed time, they were instructed to continue or begin their answer in the next section.
Scoring. Participants' comprehension of the source models was assessed by evaluating their interpretations of the meaning of the models. Whenever a model was interpreted as showing that the weights of a larger item equaled the weight of a set of smaller objects, it was scored as a 1. Other responses were given a score of 0.
Three measures concerning participants' problem-solving performance were examined and are listed below.
1. The percentage of participants successfully solving the target problem. If the answer was correct and complete, a score of 1 was given. An appropriate and complete solution included the idea that smaller objects can equal the weight of a heavier item and a concrete procedure to obtain the weight of the elephant by weighing smaller objects. For example, in the case of the boat solution, a complete answer would involve putting the elephant on the boat and marking the water level on the boat, replacing the elephant with rocks or other smaller items such as containers or boxes until the water surface reached the mark, and weighing the smaller items separately with the small scale. For the tree solution, a complete answer would involve using the tree and the rope to balance the elephant and some smaller items and then weighing the items separately with the small scale.
If the answer was incorrect or incomplete, a score of 0 was given. Some examples of an incorrect answer would be to "cut the elephant into pieces and then weigh them," "put the elephant on the boat and see if the boat sinks," or "tie the elephant to a branch of the tree and see if it pulls the tree down." An answer that contained the idea of using the smaller items without explaining why and how was also scored as 0.
2. Another measure for problem-solving performance was a six-point efficiency scale (1-6) designed to evaluate whether the problem was solved and how quickly and readily a correct answer was provided. For example, if the correct answer was provided during the time block, it received a score of 1; if the correct answer was provided in the second time block, the efficiency score was 2; and so forth. If no correct answer was generated, a score of 6 was assigned.
3. The third measure of participants' problem-solving performance was the percentage of participants coming up with appropriate solutions, including those containing only a general idea without a complete procedure. An answer was considered to be a general solution if it contained the idea of estimating the elephant's weight by comparing it with the weights of other smaller objects but did not include an explanation of how to implement this principle. An example of such a general solution is that, "we can find some way to compare the elephant and the containers, by weighing the containers separately with the scale and then adding up their weights."
The problem-solving performance of 74 randomly selected participants was scored independently by two condition-blind observers. Agreements between the two scorers on the solutions generated by participants (correct or incorrect solutions) was 95%.
Results
Preliminary analysis of the percentages of participants coming up with solutions for the two problem versions (37% and 32% for the tree and boat versions, respectively) yielded no reliable differences. The pattern of group differences was also consistent between the boat and tree solutions. Therefore, all the data were combined over problem versions, as indicated in Table 1 . One question was whether participants comprehended the superordinate concept of the models. The data showed that the percentage of participants correctly interpreting the weight equivalence notion of the source models was 90%, 81%, 74%, and 80% in the principle only, similar principle, similar strategy, and similar procedure conditions, respectively. No reliable differences were found. The central focus of the analysis was to determine whether participants solved the target problem more effectively when the source models shared a solution with the target problem at more concrete levels. As is evident in Table 2 , the percentage of participants successfully solving the target problem was 33%, 25%, 39%, 66%, and 14% for the principle only, similar principle, similar strategy, similar procedure, and control conditions, respectively. An overall chi-square test yielded significant differences among these conditions, 2 (4, N ϭ 163) ϭ 20.15, p Ͻ .001. Planned paired comparisons revealed that the percentage of participants executing complete solutions in the similar procedure condition was reliably higher than those in the control, 2 (1, N ϭ 57) ϭ 15.5, p Ͻ .001, principle only, 2 (1, N ϭ 59) ϭ 6.11, p Ͻ .05, similar principle, 2 (1, N ϭ 82) ϭ 13.23, p Ͻ .001, and similar strategy conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 52) ϭ 3.59, p ϭ .058. The percentage of participants successfully solving the problem in the similar strategy condition was also significantly higher than that in the control condition, 2 (1, N ϭ 51) ϭ 4.10, p Ͻ .05. Scores for the efficiency scale for the five conditions are shown in Table 2 . These scores revealed a pattern much like that obtained for the percentage of participants solving the target problem. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on these data yielded significant differences among conditions, F(4, 158) ϭ 6.14, MSE ϭ 28.21, p Ͻ .001, and paired comparisons showed that only participants in the similar procedure condition outperformed those in the control condition.
To summarize, participants' problem-solving performance differed as a function of which source model participants received before attempting to solve the target problem. Participants' performance benefited from similarity shared between the source model and the target problem at the level of solution procedure.
Discussion
These results indicate that participants' problem-solving performance depended on which source model they received before attempting to solve the problem. When participants received a source model similar to the target solution at a more concrete procedure level (e.g., the hanging balance model for the tree solution, or the sinking compression model for the boat solution), they were more likely to come up with an analogous solution to the target problem than those who received analogues similar at more abstract levels. A similar strategy model (e.g., the seesaw balance model for the tree solution) was less effective than a similar procedure model but still more effective than the irrelevant diagram in facilitating problem solving. Neither the principle only model nor the similar principle model (e.g., the balance models for the boat solution or the compression models for the tree solution) facilitated problem solving. When we examined participants' attempts to adopt only the general concept, no differences across conditions were obtained. Although the likelihood of coming up with the general idea was similar in all of the experimental conditions, participants in the similar procedure condition generated complete and workable solutions more readily than those in the other conditions.
In this study, there was only one possible and appropriate solution (either the boat solution or the tree solution) for each version of the target problem. Given this circumstance, we could not examine whether and how the source information influenced participants' choices of available solutions. If both solutions were appropriate for the target problem, it would allow us to assess how different types of source models influence the selection and execution of solutions.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1. We used both solutions that were appropriate for solving the problem and the same target problem, which could be solved by using either the boat or the tree and the rope. The conditions differed only in the source model that the participants received before attempting to solve the target problem. When either of the compression models (i.e., the spring compression or the sinking compression models) was presented, the boat solution was considered the consistent solution whereas the tree solution was the inconsistent solution. Accordingly, when the balance models (i.e., the seesaw balance or the hanging balance models) were provided, the tree solution was the consistent solution and the boat solution was the inconsistent one. The major hypothesis was that if procedural similarity facilitates the executing process, participants in the similar procedure condition (e.g., receiving the sinking compression model) would use the consistent solution (the boat solution) more readily than the inconsistent one (the tree solution). Likewise, participants in the similar strategy condition might be also more likely to use the consistent solution (e.g., receiving the spring compression model and using the boat solution) than the inconsistent solution (receiving the spring compression model and using the tree solution). However, more profound different performances in using the consistent and inconsistent solutions were predicted in the similar procedure condition than in the similar strategy condition. Finally, because the principle only model did not contain any concrete procedure, the tree and the boat solutions could not be identified as consistent or inconsistent, and, therefore, no discrepancy in the proportion of participants using these two solutions was predicted. 
Method
Participants. One hundred eighty-eight undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of Kentucky served as participants in this experiment for course credit.
Design, materials, and procedure. The five source models were identical to those used in Experiment 1. The target problem was modified so that the list of items consisted of a boat as well as a tree and a piece of rope that could be used to solve the problem. Thus, both solution procedures (the boat and the tree solutions) were appropriate for the target problem. Five groups were included in this experiment: principle only; spring compression; sinking compression; seesaw balance; and hanging balance models. Because the difficulty level of the boat and the tree solutions were basically comparable, these five groups were combined into the following three conditions.
1. Principle only (no procedure) condition (n ϭ 37): Participants received the principle only model in this condition.
2. Similar strategy condition (n ϭ 71): Models used in this condition included the spring compression and the seesaw balance models. For the spring compression group, the boat solution was considered the consistent strategy solution and the tree solution was considered the inconsistent strategy solution. In contrast, for the seesaw balance group, the tree solution was the consistent strategy solution whereas the boat solution was the inconsistent strategy solution. The models in this condition were similar to the consistent target solution at the strategy level but were similar to the inconsistent target solution only at the principle level.
3. Similar procedure condition (n ϭ 80): Participants in this condition received either the sinking compression model or the hanging balance model. Again, one of the two target solutions was procedurally consistent and the other was inconsistent with the source model, depending on which of the two source models was presented. Thus, the boat solution was the consistent procedure solution for the sinking compression model but the inconsistent solution for the hanging balance model, whereas the tree solution was the consistent procedure solution for the hanging balance model but the inconsistent solution for the sinking compression model. The models in this condition were similar to the consistent target solution at the procedure level but were similar to the inconsistent target solution only at the principle level. The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1.
Results
Preliminary analysis of the percentage of participants successfully generating the boat or the tree solutions (26% vs. 24%, respectively) across conditions yielded no reliable difference. Therefore, the data were combined over these two solutions. It should be noted that the overall percentage for the solutions was lower than that in Experiment 1, presumably because both solutions were appropriate for the target problem but very few participants solved the target problem using both solutions.
Of central interest in this study was the pattern of consistent and inconsistent solutions across conditions. In the similar strategy and similar procedure conditions, each participant could potentially come up with a consistent and/or inconsistent solution. For the principle only condition, the boat and tree solutions were not identified as consistent or inconsistent solutions because the principle only model was assumed to be equally distant from both solutions. Thus, in this condition, the boat and tree solutions were randomly assigned as consistent and inconsistent solutions. The scoring system was the same as that used in Experiment 1. The results are summarized in Table 3 .
The focus of the analysis was to determine whether participants used a consistent solution more readily than an inconsistent solution and whether this difference was more striking in the similar procedure than in the similar strategy condition. Our initial analysis examined the percentage of participants using the consistent and inconsistent solutions. An overall chi-square test performed on the percentage of participants using the consistent solution yielded significant differences, 2 (2, N ϭ 188) ϭ 7.75, p Ͻ .05, among the three conditions. Additional chi-square analyses revealed that the percentage of participants generating consistent solutions in the similar procedure condition was reliably higher than that in the principle only, 2 (1, N ϭ 117) ϭ 5.09, p Ͻ .05, and similar strategy conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 151) ϭ 5.23, p Ͻ .05. In contrast, fewer participants in the similar procedure condition used the inconsistent solution than in the other conditions, 2 (2, N ϭ 188) ϭ 4.85, p ϭ .089, suggesting that the solution-specific details provided by the similar procedures might have inhibited the ability to generate other solutions.
To determine if there were differences in participants' efficiency scores for the consistent and inconsistent solutions across conditions, we computed a 3 (condition type: principle vs. similar strategy vs. similar procedure) ϫ 2 (solution type: consistent vs. inconsistent) ANOVA, with repeated measures on solution type. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for solution type, F(1, 185) ϭ 14.27, MSE ϭ 62.00, p Ͻ .001, but not for condition. More important, this analysis also yielded a significant interaction between these two factors, F(2, 185) ϭ 4.61, MSE ϭ 20.05, p Ͻ .01, indicating that there were striking differences in solution type in the similar procedure condition but not in other conditions.
Discussion
The results for the consistent solution reveal a basic pattern of problem-solving performance similar to that in Experiment 1. However, the inconsistent solution performance did not differ across conditions. Moreover, the frequency of participants' using a consistent solution was higher than using an inconsistent solution only in the similar procedure condition. These findings demonstrate the effects of the procedural details illustrated in the source models on subsequent problem solving. It is assumed that procedural similarity enables participants to execute a solution, yet evidence concerning whether similarity in procedure facilitates transfer through the accessing or the executing processes remains to be obtained.
Experiment 3
It is not yet evident whether the overall low transfer performance in the low procedural similarity conditions was attributable to a difficulty in the execution process, or, alternatively, whether it was due to a failure to access the analogous relations, and to map the large object in the model with the elephant in the target problem and the smaller items with the rocks. Experiment 3 addressed this issue by providing a hint to use the source model and by adding the labels elephant to the large object and rocks to the smaller items in the source models. If participants' earlier poor performance was due to an obstacle in noticing the analogous relations and to a failure to link these items, the added hints and labels should help them notice the relations and map the items and, hence, facilitate problem solving. However, if the performance pattern remains the same as in the previous studies, it would be reasonable to conclude that the absent or discrepant source solution procedures hinder the executing process.
Method
Participants. The participants were 89 undergraduates at the University of Kentucky.
Design, materials, and procedure. The design, target problem, and procedure were the same as those used in Experiment 2. The source models used in this study were the principle only (n ϭ 30) and the balance models because no differences were obtained between the balance and compression models in the previous studies. Participants in the similar procedure condition (n ϭ 33) received the hanging balance model, whereas participants in the similar strategy condition (n ϭ 26) viewed the seesaw balance model before attempting to solve the target problem. Thus, the tree solution in this study was the consistent solution and the boat solution was the inconsistent solution. The key revision in this study was that the labels Elephant and Rocks were added above the sketches of the large object and the smaller items in the source models. These labels, combined with a hint to consider the source model ("the picture you saw may be helpful in solving this problem"), should help participants to retrieve the source picture and to match the corresponding items. Table 4 , the pattern of results paralleled those in the previous experiments. Our initial analysis examined the proportion of participants using consistent and inconsistent solutions. For the consistent solution, an overall chi-square test yielded significant differences among these conditions, 2 (2, N ϭ 89) ϭ 8.66, p ϭ .01. Additional chi-square analyses revealed that the percentage of participants using the consistent (tree) solution in the similar procedure condition was reliably higher than that in the similar strategy, 2 (1, N ϭ 59) ϭ 4.21, p Ͻ .05, and principle only conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 63) ϭ 7.60, p Ͻ .01. In contrast, a lower percentage of participants in the similar procedure condition used the inconsistent (boat) solution than in the other conditions, 2 (2, N ϭ 89) ϭ 6.15, p ϭ .046.
Results

As revealed in
The pattern of results in the efficiency score was comparable. We performed a 3 (condition: principle vs. similar strategy vs. similar procedure) ϫ 2 (solution type: consistent vs. inconsistent) ANOVA, with repeated measures on solution type. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for solution type, F(1, 86) ϭ 8.36, MSE ϭ 31.13, p Ͻ .005, but not for condition. The interaction between these two factors was significant, F(2, 86) ϭ 5.22, MSE ϭ 19.43, p Ͻ .001. A one-way ANOVA on the consistent solution revealed a significant difference across conditions, F(2, 86) ϭ 3.79, MSE ϭ 16.79, p Ͻ .05. Subsequent t tests yielded a significant difference between the similar procedure condition and the principle only condition ( p Ͻ .05). For the inconsistent solution, participants in the similar strategy condition outperformed participants in the similar procedure condition ( p Ͻ .05). However, because the source model effectively guided participants in the similar procedure condition in using the consistent solution, it is not surprising that they came up with the inconsistent solution less readily.
Discussion
This study reveals a performance pattern similar to that demonstrated in the prior experiments, even though hints were provided to enhance accessing the source models and labels were added to facilitate the matching of correspondences between specific, relevant items. Although the similar solution procedure depicted in the source models guided participants how to use the relevant items, the lack of concrete procedural similarity (similar only at the strategy or principle levels) resulted in participants' experiencing greater difficulty in using the available solution and, hence, hindered transfer.
Experiment 4
The overall low transfer performance in Experiments 1-3 may have been a result of the method by which participants were tested, as they participated in groups and received no feedback on their solutions. The goal of this study was to gather further evidence and to obtain a more precise picture concerning how participants use the source analogue models in solving the target problem. Participants worked individually with an experimenter and were asked, after viewing and interpreting a source model, to think aloud while attempting to solve the target problem and were encouraged to keep talking and to come up with any ideas to solve the problem. Whenever an idea generated by the participants was not complete, the experimenter encouraged him or her to elaborate on the solution and to provide more detailed procedures for obtaining the weight of the elephant. Participants' protocols were recorded and later analyzed to determine whether the opportunity to elaborate on their answers and the longer time allowed for problem solving increased participants' performance in the lower similarity procedure conditions (e.g., similar strategy condition) and decreased the differences in transfer performance across conditions. It was predicted that participants would be able to use not only a similar procedure model but also a similar strategy model in solving the target problem.
Method
Participants. Participants were 65 undergraduate students at the University of Kentucky.
Design and materials. The design and materials were similar to those in the previous studies. Participants received one of the five source models before attempting to solve the target problem. No labels were used in the source models.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. They were first informed that they would be asked to complete two separate tasks: to view a picture and, then, to solve a hypothetical problem. One of the schematic models was then presented and the participant was asked to interpret the possible meanings of the model within 60 s. He or she was then instructed to "do something else"-to solve the target problem. The participant was then given the target problem and told to read the story problem within 80 s. Below the story were sketched the same items presented in Experiment 2 (see Appendix A). The experimenter then asked the participant to solve the problem using any of the depicted items in any way possible. He or she was encouraged to talk aloud throughout the process and to generate any appropriate and concrete solutions within 300 s. If at the end of this time period the participant had not provided both the boat and the tree solutions, he or she was directed to attend to the source model again and to consider its usefulness. The participant was allowed to continue to solve the problem for another 120 s. Finally, the participant was asked whether the source model was similar to the target solution and whether it had helped him or her to solve the problem. The participants' protocols were tape recorded for later analysis.
Scoring and Results
As in the previous studies, two solutions, the boat and the tree solutions, could be used to solve the target problem. One of the two solutions was consistent, and the other was inconsistent, with the source model. Again, because the ease with which participants generated the two solutions was approximately the same and no reliable differences were obtained, the five groups were combined into three conditions: principle only (n ϭ 12), similar strategy (n ϭ 28), and similar procedure conditions (n ϭ 25).
The criteria for scoring the correct or incorrect solutions were the same as in Experiments 1-3. The problem-solving time was calculated from the starting point to the completion of the first solution. If a particular solution (either the tree or the boat solution) was not achieved, a score of 300 s was given.
One observer coded all the participants' problem-solving activities from all the protocols. Another scorer coded 16 participants' activities. An agreement of 94% on the correctness of participants' problem solving between these two scorers was achieved. The correlation for the coding of problem-solving time between the two observers was .97.
Given that a longer time was allotted to solve the target problem and that participants were encouraged to elaborate on their solutions, it is not surprising that more participants generated at least one solution for the target problem and that more participants came up with both solutions in this study than in Experiments 1-3. The percentage of participants coming up with at least one of the two solutions to the target problem was 50%, 71%, and 72% in the principle only, similar strategy and similar procedure conditions, respectively. However, this is not a measure that sensitively reflects the influence of the source models because the relations between the source model and each of the solutions were different.
The percentage of participants generating consistent and inconsistent solutions and the mean time (seconds) in using these two types of solutions were assessed. Moreover, because several participants came up with both solutions, it was of particular interest to obtain the percentage of participants who used a solution consistent in procedure with the source model as either the first or only solution. This score was more sensitive in assessing the influence of the source models on the implementation of a solution. The data are summarized in Table 5 .
To examine the possible effects of procedural similarity on the use of the consistent solution (see Table 5 , Column 1), an overall chi-square was carried out for the consistent solution as the first or only solution. This analysis yielded a reliable difference among these conditions, 2 (2, N ϭ 65) ϭ 5.85, p Ͻ .05. Paired comparisons also revealed that more participants generated the consistent solution as the first or only solution in the similar procedure condition than in the principle only, 2 (1, N ϭ 37) ϭ 3.98, p Ͻ .05, or the similar strategy conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 53) ϭ 4.37, p Ͻ .05. Note. % ϭ percentage of participants. a The solutions generated in the principle only condition could not be identified as consistent or inconsistent. Five out of 12 participants (41%) came up with the boat solution, whereas three of them (25%) generated the tree solution. The data for the principle only condition represent the mean percentage (33%) of all participants using the boat and the tree solutions. Thus, the data in the Consistent and Inconsistent solution columns are identical. b Spring compression or seesaw balance models. c Sinking compression or hanging balance models.
An overall chi-square performed on the consistent solution, whether generated as the first or second solution (see Table 5 , Column 2), yielded only a marginally reliable difference across conditions, 2 (2, N ϭ 65) ϭ 5.03, p Ͻ .10, and paired comparisons revealed only a difference between the similar procedure and principle only conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 37) ϭ 5.03, p Ͻ .05. No differences were obtained across conditions for the inconsistent solution. Representative examples of participants' protocols of problem solving are presented in Appendix B.
Problem-solving time is another sensitive measure to assess the effects of the source models on participants' problem-solving performance using these two types of solutions. We performed a 3 (condition: principle vs. similar strategy vs. similar procedure) ϫ 2 (solution type: consistent vs. inconsistent) ANOVA, with repeated measures on solution type. This analysis revealed significant main effects for solution type, F(1, 62) ϭ 9.64, MSE ϭ 62,271, p Ͻ .005, but not for condition. The interaction between these two factors was significant, F(2, 62) ϭ 3.31, MSE ϭ 21,520, p ϭ .05. Subsequent t tests on the time to use the consistent and inconsistent solutions yielded a significant difference in the similar procedure condition, t(24) ϭ Ϫ4.38, p Ͻ .001, and a marginal difference in the similar strategy condition, t(27) ϭ Ϫ1.67, p ϭ .10. Moreover, participants in the similar procedure condition came up with the consistent solution more quickly than those in the principle only condition ( p Ͻ .05). No differences were found in the amount of time needed to arrive at inconsistent solutions across conditions. Participants' performance after the hint is another measure to assess the effects of procedural similarity. Of interest, not many participants came up with more solutions after the hint: 5 participants in the similar procedure, 3 participants in the similar strategy, and 3 participants in the principle only conditions generated one more complete solution after the hint. Thus, the basic trend of participants' problem-solving performance remained the same even after the hint was provided.
Finally, participants' answers to the questions of whether the source model was similar to the target solution and whether it had helped their problem solving were analyzed with chi-square tests. Most participants across conditions thought the schematic models were similar to the target problem and no reliable differences were obtained in the similarity responses (73%, 75%, and 96% in the principle only, similar strategy, and similar procedure conditions, respectively). However, more participants in similar procedure than in the other conditions claimed that the models were helpful. The responses concerning the helpfulness of the models across conditions (36%, 50%, and 91%, respectively) were significantly different, 2 (2, N ϭ 65) ϭ 12.62, p Ͻ .001.
Discussion
The principle only model remained ineffective. However, the gap evident in the transfer performance between the similar procedure and the similar strategy models of Experiments 1-3 was decreased here: Participants in these two conditions differed only in the frequency with which they generated the consistent solution as the first or only solution. This finding suggests that when participants had the opportunity to elaborate on their answers, even the models that were only moderately similar to the target problem were somewhat efficient in promoting problem-solving performance.
The differences between the use of the consistent and inconsistent solutions in both of the concrete procedure conditions remained obvious. Participants were more likely to generate solutions that shared with the source models either a similar procedure (the consistent solutions in the similar procedure condition) or a similar strategy (the consistent solutions in the similar strategy condition) than they were to generate solutions that shared with the source models only a general principle (the inconsistent solutions in both conditions). These results indicate that an analogue similar to the target solution at either a strategy or a procedure level is more effective in promoting transfer than is an analogue similar at a principle level only.
Experiment 5
It is not yet obvious whether it was the procedural features (the conceptual information) or the superficial features of the source models that influenced transfer performance in Experiments 1-4. There remains a need to document that the problem-solving performance differences between the various conditions are attributable to procedural similarity but not to superficial (perceptual) similarity. Although unlikely, it nonetheless remains a possibility that the superficial features (e.g., objects) of some source models, rather than the depicted procedures, cued participants to select the key tools and match them to the target when solving the problem and, thus, facilitated noticing and mapping processes. For example, the higher transfer performance associated with the sinking compression model could be attributed to the surface features of the floating container depicted in the source model, which, because of its possible perceptual similarity to the boat, may have cued participants to select the boat as the necessary tool. This study provided a test of this issue by controlling the possible role of superficial similarity. Here, the boat solution was the sole correct solution because the tree and the rope were not mentioned in the story. The sketches of the items below the target story were deleted, with the exception of a drawing of the boat. Furthermore, all participants were instructed to use the boat in their solutions. If the differing transfer performances among the various conditions obtained in the previous experiments were due to the differential perceptual features of the models, explicitly pointing out the analogous relations and informing participants to use the key item (e.g., the boat) should diminish the transfer differences across conditions. However, if the different performances remain, it would be more likely that it was the procedural information depicted in the source models that influences transfer through a postmapping process-the execution process.
Method
Participants. Participants were 167 undergraduate students at the University of Kentucky.
Design, materials, and procedure. Five conditions were included in this study: similar procedure (sinking compression model; n ϭ 33); similar strategy (spring compression model; n ϭ 34); similar principle (hanging balance model; n ϭ 32); principle only (n ϭ 31); and control (n ϭ 37). Some participants in the control condition (n ϭ 16) saw an irrelevant picture (a square), whereas others (n ϭ 21) viewed the same floating container as in the sinking compression model but without the conceptual (procedural) information (i.e., the large and small objects were not included). This control model was used to test whether the similar item alone depicted in a source model facilitates transfer. The target story problem was similar to that used in the previous studies, although the big tree was not mentioned in this story version. At the end of the story, only a sketch of the boat was provided.
Participants, tested in groups, were first instructed to view the model and to interpret its possible meanings (without writing them down) within 2 min. Participants were then told to read the story problem carefully within 80 s. After reading the story problem, the participants were instructed to solve the problem "using the boat and any other items mentioned in the story, such as the small scale." Furthermore, all participants were informed that the source picture, which remained visible to them, might help them solve the problem. A total of 200 s was allowed for generating solutions to the target problem.
Results and Discussion
The percentage of participants successfully generating a complete boat solution in each condition was observed. As shown in Table 6 , the effects of procedural similarity on transfer performance remained. This pattern of results was highly consistent with those obtained in the previous experiments. An overall chi-square test yielded significant differences among these five conditions, 2 (4, N ϭ 167) ϭ 31.43, p Ͻ .0001. Predetermined paired comparisons revealed that the percentage of participants solving the problem in the similar procedure condition was marginally higher than in the similar strategy condition, 2 (1, N ϭ 67) ϭ 3.44, p ϭ .064, and reliably higher than in the other conditions ( ps Ͻ .001). Participants in the similar strategy condition also outperformed those in the control condition, 2 (1, N ϭ 70) ϭ 6.62, p Ͻ .01. A performance pattern highly consistent with that of Experiments 1-4 was obtained even when participants were instructed to use the boat to solve the problem. Thus, the differences in transfer performance between the various conditions can only be attributed to the differential conceptual meanings (i.e., procedural features) illustrated in the models, because the possible role of the superficial features was controlled by instructing participants to use the boat. The compression models guided participants in operating the key items and in achieving an appropriate and complete solution. These results also strengthen our interpretation that procedural similarity promotes transfer through the executing process because transfer performance remained different across conditions even when the participants were only required to figure out a way to operate on the key items.
General Discussion
Summary of the Major Findings
These five studies provide consistent and converging evidence supporting our hypotheses concerning whether and how procedural similarity influences analogical transfer. The level of procedural similarity, as one major aspect of overall similarity, determines the degree of transfer and the magnitude of problem-solving performance. The major findings can be summarized as follows: (a) Pictorial models providing a solution procedure similar to that required in the target problem were used more readily by participants than other types of models (Experiments 1 and 2) . The results indicate that the ease with which participants came up with an appropriate, concrete, and complete solution for the target problem was determined, to a large extent, by the degree of procedural similarity between the source and the target solution; (b) The basic patterns of problem-solving performance remained the same even when the general analogous relations were pointed out and the key corresponding items were matched (Experiment 3), and when participants were given a chance to elaborate on their solutions (Experiment 4) and were instructed to use the key item (e.g., the boat) to solve the problem (Experiment 5). These findings indicate that the obstacle to using these models is attributable to the difficulty in executing the general idea but not in accessing the models or in mapping the key components between the model and the target problem.
Principle-Based Versus Instance-Based Learning
Much theorizing and research has been directed to the question of how abstract principles and concrete examples influence subsequent learning and problem solving. It appears that successful analogical transfer is a consequence of the construction of abstract schemas based on concrete examples (e.g., Chen & Daehler, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983) . However, research on learning and transfer (e.g., Anderson, Farrell, & Sauers, 1984; Brown & Kane, 1988) indicates that an abstract solution principle provided without the support of concrete examples tends to remain "inert" (e.g., Bransford, Sherwood, Vye, & Rieser, 1986) and thus yields little transfer (e.g., Reeves & Weisberg, 1993; Ross, 1987) . Studies with mathematical and physics problems (e.g., Anzai & Simon, 1979; Ross, 1987 Ross, , 1989 Sweller & Cooper, 1985) have shown the importance of learning from examples perhaps because the execution component plays such a key role in transfer and problem solving.
A solution principle tends to be considered ineffective in facilitating problem solving because it lacks the support of concrete contexts or procedural details. The effects of these two types of exemplar-specific information on transfer, however, have not yet been fully distinguished. The present study demonstrates that an abstract solution principle that lacks the support of illustrative procedures yields little transfer because the absence of procedural details hinders the execution process. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that abstract principles and instance-specific information must coexist to yield efficient transfer. One reason explaining the importance of such specific information is that efficient abstract knowledge is usually derived from concrete information. Moreover, relevant specific information is often directly used in guiding problem-solving activity. This argument is consistent with the thesis proposed by several theorists who have emphasized the virtues of specificity in reasoning and problem solving. As Medin and Ross (1989) have argued, learning, reasoning and problem solving are "often case-based and often rely on specific examples" (p. 190). Abstract and specific forms of knowledge complement each other in their benefits to problem solving.
A Conceptual Model of Analogical Problem Solving
Most existing theories and models of analogical reasoning focus on superficial and structural similarity between problems and the accessing and mapping processes. The present research is motivated by the need to examine similarity beyond superficial and structural, and to understand further the mechanisms involved in and the factors influencing the execution of source solutions. We propose below a conceptual model illustrating how the execution process is influenced by the level of procedural similarity. The model provides an explanation of why some analogous solutions are easier to use than others and how individuals select and apply learned solutions in solving novel problems. The model is based on the following three basic assumptions.
1. Hierarchical analyses of procedural similarity. An analogue can be represented at different abstraction levels of procedural similarity. Accordingly, drawing analogies in problem solving may occur at all levels in the hierarchical representation of solution procedures. Analogous problem solutions may exist at a very concrete level, being similar to a target solution not only in their general orientation but also in their specific operational details. At an intermediate level, the source and target solutions will share a similar strategy. At the other end of the continuum, a problem might be similar to another at a general principle level but might require a different procedure. It should be noted that the number of levels at which a source and target problem share a solution is arbitrary and depends on the type of problem. For example, most ill-defined or insight problems may involve fewer similarity levels (Gick & Holyoak, 1980 and, hence, application is often straightforward once a principle is retrieved. However, welldefined problems such as mathematics and physics problems (e.g., Reed & Bolstad, 1991) may involve multiple levels of procedural similarity. These assumptions require further theoretical analysis and empirical demonstration.
It is argued that procedural similarity is distinct from the other two types of similarity. First, similarity in procedure differs from structural similarity. In the present research, it was manipulated without altering the basic analogical relations between the models and the target problem or the general solution principle. The schematic models depict the weight equivalence principle but do not involve elaborated goal structures typically associated with verbal, story problem analogies and, thus, the structural relations are kept constant. The source models differ only in conceptual information that is relevant to implementing a solution principle.
Second, procedural similarity also differs from superficial similarity. In the present research, the schematic models differed in whether they illustrated a procedure that was the same as the solution required for solving the target problem. Procedural similarity was manipulated without altering superficial similarity for the most part. The similar principle and similar strategy models did not differ in object similarity. The hanging balance (similar procedure) also did not differ from the seesaw balance model (similar strategy) in object similarity. The only exception is that the floating container in the sinking compression model (similar procedure) resembles the boat in the target problem and, thus, the model, as compared with the spring compression model (similar strategy), is somewhat perceptually similar to the target problem. However, the effects of procedural similarity on transfer performance were evident regardless of whether object similarity was involved. In contrast, object similarity alone (e.g., models depicting the floating container but not a solution) did not facilitate transfer. Furthermore, performance differences across conditions were obtained even when the possible function of superficial features in cuing participants to select the key items in solving the problem was controlled.
Thus, the procedural features manipulated in the present research are distinct from superficial and structural features. A schematic depiction of the three types of similarity is presented in Figure 2 . It was the procedural information (the illustration of how to implement the weight equivalence notion) that guided participants in operating the key items and in achieving an appropriate and complete solution. The procedural information was responsible for the differing transfer performance.
Finally, procedural similarity also differs from the other two types of similarity in its impact on transfer process. Differential transfer performances across conditions were evident even when hints to use the source models and to use the key items in solving the target problem were provided. These results indicated that procedural similarity influenced transfer through a postmapping process. This point will be elaborated in later discussion.
2. Procedural similarity and transfer performance. When other types of similarity are kept constant, the degree of transfer and performance is largely determined by the level of procedural similarity between the source and target problems. When only a superordinate notion is available, the gap between the source analogue and the target problem is remote, and the solver will need to transform the abstract idea into concrete procedural operations. Thus, the probability of arriving at a complete solution will be lower and the time to arrive at a solution longer than if this transformation was guided by analogous procedural details. When the source and target problems are similar at a strategy level, the implementation distance between the problem solutions is an intermediate one because the source model provides at least a more concrete way (e.g., compression or balance) to execute the solution, although the procedural details still differ from those required for the target solution and participants still face the task of transforming the strategy to a specific procedure. Thus, the probability of participants' successfully solving the problem is somewhat higher than when only a superordinate solution principle is shared. Finally, if the source and target solutions share a similar concrete procedure, the transfer distance is near and the probability of successful problem solving is highest because the execution process is more direct and straightforward. However, if a source procedure differs from the target solution, and when participants insist on using the available inappropriate procedure, negative transfer could occur because people often "apply procedures rigidly and inappropriately" (Mayer, 1989, p. 50) . Human thinking and problem solving tends to be not only context dependent but often procedure bound as well (e.g., Luchins, 1942) .
3. Procedural similarity and execution process. How does the degree of procedural similarity impact the cognitive processes and subsequent transfer? The relations between a source analogue and the target problem in terms of specific procedural operations are particularly critical for executing solutions. Drawing analogies begins with noticing and mapping analogical relations. These mechanisms have been examined extensively in other studies (e.g., Anderson, 1987; Gentner, 1989; Gentner & Landers, 1985; Markman & Gentner, 1993; Ross, 1989 ). The source analogous solution then needs to be implemented in a workable procedure to reach a goal. At this stage, the source procedure, or operational details associated with the solution, is critical in guiding and directing the executing process. The absence of a concrete procedure may cause difficulty in applying a solution to another problem situation. Participants might not know how the abstract principle can be executed. Moreover, even if a concrete procedure is provided, whether individuals are able to implement the solution also depends on the degree to which the concrete procedure is similar to the required target solution.
The results provide evidence that it is the execution component that is associated with the effects of procedural similarity on transfer. Participants receiving source models similar in procedure to the target solution were better able to generate complete solutions than those who received models with lower procedural similarity. Difficulty in executing a solution can be due to either the absence of concrete procedures or the presence of dissimilar procedures in the source information. The execution component explanation is particularly plausible given that participants in the principle only and similar principle conditions exhibited ineffective transfer, whereas those in the similar procedure conditions (and, to a lesser extent, in the similar strategy conditions) showed effective use of the source models in all five experiments. This pattern continued to be evident even when participants received hints to use the source models and even when they were explicitly told to use the key item (e.g., the boat) to solve the target problem. These results provide strong evidence supporting our hierarchical conceptualization of procedural similarity and the assumption that procedural similarity promotes the executing of, rather than the accessing of, a source principle.
This conceptual model can explain the observation that people often experience difficulty in problem solving, not only when the spontaneous drawing of analogies is required, but also after the analogous relation has been pointed out. This model can also account for empirical findings regarding the issue of why it is more difficult to use some analogues in problem solving than others, and why participants often fail to solve an analogous problem even when the source and target problems share a similar solution principle. The hierarchical conception of procedural similarity proposed and tested herein is congruent with studies (e.g., Catrambone, 1996; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Reed & Bolstad, 1991; Reed, Dempster, & Ettinger, 1985) that showed that students often failed to adapt a mathematical solution when solving a problem that required a modification of the equation.
Although the present study also confirms the importance of the execution process, it extends these previous findings by directly manipulating procedural similarity (high, medium, and low procedural similarity in a hierarchy) and by examining the effects of the degree of similarity on transfer. The present results also indicate that the execution component is a critical process involved in the transfer of well-defined (e.g., mathematical) and ill-defined (insight) problems. Procedural implementation has also proved to be an important dimension of similarity that influences insightful problem solving. The present results also suggest that problem solving by pictorial analogy may be governed by mechanisms similar to those involved in verbal analogical reasoning (including physics and mathematical materials), although further examination is needed to compare verbal and pictorial analogies directly.
The present findings highlight the utilizational constraints of procedural operations in analogical transfer and support the assumption that individuals' problem-solving attempts are often governed by the specific procedures in the source problems. Yet, the powerful role of specific information on transfer has only begun to be explored. Under optimal situations, individuals may be able to establish flexible schemas that permit the transformation of dissimilar procedures in solving novel problems. For example, when multiple discrepant procedures are available as source information, the variability of concrete procedures may serve as a basis for participants to establish a flexible mental representation that thus facilitates the utilization of the learned solutions.
Conclusion
The issue of how people draw analogous relations has been investigated extensively (e.g., Clement & Gentner, 1991; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997; Markman & Gentner, 2000; Reeves & Weisberg, 1993; Ross, 1984 Ross, , 1987 Ross, , 1989 ). Yet, the questions of how the level of similarity in various dimensions of similarity affects transfer and of which factors constrain the selection and application of source information remain unanswered. The present research focused on a hierarchical analysis of procedural similarity and was motivated to examine the cognitive component associated with this dimension of similarity. The results essentially support the conclusion that the ease with which a source solution is implemented is largely determined by the abstraction level at which a solution is shared by a source analogue and a target problem: at a superordinate principle level, an intermediate strategy level, or a specific procedure level. The level of procedural similarity illustrated in a source analogue influences the executing process in analogical transfer.
It is evident that the overall relations between source and target problems are multidimensional, involving several types and levels of similarity, and that the cognitive activities associated with analogical transfer are often multicomponential, involving several effortful processes. An adequate theory of analogical problem solving needs to offer an explanation not only of how an analogy is drawn but also of how an analogue is implemented.
